In reality, this is
CYA security, and it's pervasive in post-9/11 America. It no longer matters if a security measure makes sense, if it's cost-effective or if it mitigates any actual threats. All that matters is that you took the threat seriously, so if something happens you won't be blamed for inaction. It's security, all right -- security for the careers of those in charge.
I'm not saying that these officials care only about their jobs and not at all about preventing terrorism, only that their priorities are skewed. They
imagine vague threats, and come up with correspondingly vague security measures intended to address them. They experience none of the costs. They're not the ones who have to deal with the
long lines and confusion at the gates. They're not the ones who have to
arrive early to avoid the messes the new policies have caused around the league. And if fans spend more money at the concession stands because they've arrived an hour early and have had the food and drinks they tried to bring along confiscated, so much the better, from the team owners' point of view.
I can hear the objections to this as I write. You don't
know these measures won't be effective! What if something happens? Don't we have to do everything possible to protect ourselves against terrorism?
That's
worst-case thinking, and it's dangerous. It leads to bad decisions, bad design and bad security. A better approach is to realistically assess the threats, judge security measures on their effectiveness and take their costs into account. And the result of that calm, rational look will be the realization that there will always be places where we pack ourselves densely together, and that we should spend less time trying to secure those places and more time finding terrorist plots before they can be carried out.
